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• THE VIABILITY OF RURAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
INTRODUCTION 
A financial crisis exists in many countries in the world 
today (Long). Several banks have been forced to close or merge 
with stronger institutions. Many others teeter on the verge of 
closing with their insolvencies hidden by government subsidies. 
Bank regulators often must overlook the true magnitude of 
nonperforming assets knowiAg that if the assets of many financial 
institutions were written down to their market value, liabilities 
would exceed assets. Insurance and guarantee fund~. when they 
exist, often have too few assets to cover potential losses. 
These financial problems exist in widely disparate 
situations. They exist in rapidly growing countries (Hong Kong), 
in oil rich countries (Mexico), in poor countries (Bangladesh), 
and in rich countries (U.S.). They exist with institutions that 
have little or no agricultural loan exposure, and with 
specialized agricultural lenders. They exist in financial 
institutions once considered models for agricultural deve~opment, 
such as the Cooperative Farm Credit System of the U.S. The 
causes of this crisis are complex. In the agricultural arena 
they include macro policy changes (tight monetary-policy which 
doubled farm interest rates in the U.S. in three years), cyclical 
declines in commodity prices, controlled interest rates which 
forced lenders to rely on government funds rather than deposits, 
poor management of financial institutions, excessively rapid 
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expansion of bank and branch networks, and inefficient lending 
sometimes linked to corruption. 
Although some problems would have been difficult to avoid 
because of unforeseen macroeconomic developments, it is also 
obvious that policymakers in developing countries paid too little 
attention to the viability of financial institutions during the 
past two decades. Instead, due to their concern for short-falls 
in food production, slow technological change, and little formal 
credit going to the rural poor, they designed "supply-leading" 
financial. strategies to expand the supply of and reduce the 
interest rate on agricultural loans, and especially loans to the 
rural poor. The negative impact of these strategies on the 
financial institutions was either unforeseen, ignored, or 
accepted as a reasonable social cost for the benefits expected. 
It is surprising that the financial problems that now seem 
so clear were not anticipated before they reached crisis 
proportions. In fact many agricultural credit projects were 
judged successful while the rural financial markets in which they 
operated failed (Adams, 1988). The explanation for this paradox 
is also linked, in part, to the misplaced emphasis of trying to 
meet the perceived credit needs of farmers, while ignoring the 
development of viable financial institutions or rural financial 
systems. 
Space does not permit a complete discussion of the supply-
leading strategy, the various policies, institutions, and 
projects that make up the strategy in different developing 
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and staff. In short, unviable institutions eventually die or 
wither into irrelevancy. Their failure may produce significant 
social costs. Future financial developments may suffer because 
of the bad banking habits and expectations created, and because 
of the fear and skepticism towards banking that follows a 
failure. 
Many factors influence institutional viability but the 
important ones discussed here are 1) cost recovery, 2) loan 
recovery, 3) deposit mobilization, 4) appropriate regulation, and 
5) economic environment. Management and other factors unique to 
specific institutions are obviously important but, unless the 
broader policy, regulatory and economic environment is conducive, 
even good management will have difficulty in achieving and 
maintaining institutional viability. 
Cost Recovery 
To be financially viable over the long term, a financial 
institution must cover its interest costs (frequently the largest 
component of operating costs), noninterest costs, and bad debts. 
These represent the transaction costs of financial 
intermediation: mobilizing funds, allocating loans, and 
recovering loans made. These costs must be recovered through 
interest and noninterest income. 
Supply-leading financial policies have frequently frustrated 
an institution's ability to recover costs. First, interest rate 
margins are often tightly regulated so the spread between cost of 
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funds and lending rates is too narrow to cover operating costs. 
Second, the costs of reporting and documenting the use and impact 
~ 
of "cheap" fund~ provided by central banks and donors for 
targeted agricultural credit programs is often very high.2 
Third, many institutions are prevented from making non-targeted 
loans or non-loan investments that earn higher returns. 
Therefore, because of regulations, institutions find it difficult 
to cover costs even if they achieve 100 percent loan recovery. 
On the other hand, many financial institutions are 
inefficient. They have not developed cost-reducing technologies, 
nor have there been many incentives for efficiency because the. 
primary institutional objective has been to increase loans. Some 
of the specialized institutions and government owned banks have 
had an implicit objective of employ•ent creation. A balance must 
be struck between increasing interest rate margins sufficiently 
to cover costs versus reducing costs through iaproved 
efficiencies and new operating technologies. 
Loan Recovery 
All financial institutions anticipate some loan losses. A 
well-functioning efficient agricultural institution may expect 
losses of 1 or 2 percent of the value of loans made. Problems 
beyond the control of borrowers and lenders, such as cyclical 
downturns in commodity prices, poor weather, and unusual 
production problems, may temporarily increase loss rates above 
these levels. Losses of this magnitude, however, can usually be 
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absorbed by paying customers through higher interest rates so 
that institutional viability is not threatened. 
Loan delinquency in many targeted programs and specialized 
agricultural institutions, however, may reach 20, 30, or more 
percent 3 , too large to recover by raising interest rates. 
Furthermore, the operating costs associated with defaulted loans 
are also lost. Cuevas compared lending costs in Bangladesh, the 
Philippines, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Togo and Niger. 
Bangladesh banks reported the lowest costs of 1 to 4 percent 
while other countries reported costs in the range of 5 to 10 
percent of the amount lent. However, when risk premia were 
estimated considering current past-due ratios and a 10 percent 
opportunity cost for funds, total non-interest costs in 
Bangladesh soared to 50 to over 300 percent, much higher than in 
the other countries. 
Targeted agricultural credit policies and projects often 
directly contribute to poor loan recovery because institutions 
are rewarded for loans made rather than loans recovered. 
Borrowers correctly perceive institutional priorities and respond 
by ignoring repayment. Subsidized interest rates cause excess 
demand for funds so nonprice rationing must be used to clear the 
market. This provides fertile ground for political intervention 
into the determination of the lucky few to get the cheap funds. 
Borrowers who have sufficient political influence to get the 
loans can also use that influence to avoid repayment. 
Furthermore, once it is decided that it is socially desirable to 
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subsidize a group in society (such as the rural poor), it is 
difficult to adopt stern measures against that group, such as 
threatening the foreclosure of mortgaged assets to stimulate loan 
repayment. 
Loan guarantee programs have been introduced in many 
countries to protect institutions against loan losses, but they 
have proven to be difficult to operate with financial integrity. 
On the one hand, if collecting on the guarantee is too easy, 
lenders may make risky loans (moral hazard) knowing they are 
covered by the guarantee or may not aggressively try to collect. 
The guarantee fund then goes broke. On the other hand, if the 
procedures are too stringent, the guarantee will not be utilized 
by the lenders or will be used only for the riskiest loans. 
Making loans to groups of borrowers instead of individuals 
and requiring joint liabllity has been attempted in many 
programs. Although theoretically appealing, the results are far 
from conclusive (Adams and Ladman). In some cases, nonpayment by 
one group member leads to nonpayment by all. One of the most 
successful uses of the group concept is the Bangladesh Grameen 
Bank (Hossain). It makes very small loans to the poorest rural 
residents who form groups with five members. Two members of a 
new group get loans first and the remaining members cannot borrow 
until the first two establish a good repayment record. In 
addition, the groups are given a large amount of training, they 
must save weekly for several weeks before borrowing, and most 
loans are repaid on a weekly schedule regardless of the cash flow 
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of the investment made with the loan. Thus the impact of group 
liability cannot be easily separated from the other 
characteristics of the program which together result in a 
repayment rate exceeding 95 percent. 
The will and effort expanded to collect by the financial 
institution, as exemplified by the Grameen Bank, appears to be a 
crucial factor in achieving high loan recovery rates. 4 This is 
usually associated with the ability of a financial institution to 
avoid political pressure in deciding who should get a loan and 
targets for total lending. It also is associated with the 
discipline of mobilizing deposits and having funds available to 
meet depositor's demands for withdrawals. 
Deposit Mobilization 
The supply-leading agricultural credit strategy employed in 
many countries has frequently used banks, cooperatives and credit 
unions as retail outlets for on-lending funds provided by the 
central bank and/or donors. The amount of funds mobilized by 
these institutions, therefore, has usually been small compared to 
total loans made. Regulations even prevent some specialized 
agricultural development banks from mobilizing deposits. 
Perceptions about households and financial institutions 
explain the lack of concern for deposit mobilization. On the 
household side, it is frequently assumed that rural households, 
especially the poor, have little capacity to save. On the 
financial institution side, it is assumed that they cannot 
mobilize savings from their rural customers and, even if they 
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could, they would prefer to channel them into urban lending. 
Therefore, just as it is assumed that farmers must be bribed with 
subsidized loans to adopt new risky technology, so it is often 
assumed that financial institutions must be bribed with cheap 
rediscount funds to make risky agricultural loans. 
Greater emphasis on deposit mobilization can help correct 
some problems and distortions found in rural financial ·markets.5 
Not only do rural residents benefit by having a reliable and 
secure place to hold their financial savings, but the viability 
of financial institutions can be increased. First, as mentioned 
above, some so-called cheap funds are actually quite expensive to 
administer; deposits may actually be cheaper. Secondly, because 
of economies of scope, it may be cost effective to utilize 
manpower and other resources currently employed in lending to 
also mobilize deposits. When the Agricultural Development Bank 
in the Dominican Republic began accepting deposits in its branch 
network established for lending, it found it could do so by 
adding just a few employees. Cuevas and Graham also found it was 
cost-effective for the agricultural bank in Honduras to mobilize 
more deposits rather than rely so heavily on other sources of 
funds. 
Financial intermediaries may be more efficient in making 
good loans and improving loan recovery when they actively engage 
in deposit mobilization. First, information collection is 
important for loan screening. Depositors reveal important 
aspects about their financial management abilities by the way 
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they conduct deposit operations. This information is useful to 
the financial institution when it processes their loan 
applications. Secondly, when they mobilize deposits, lending 
institutions can develop lending programs and practices more 
appropriate to the needs and capabilities of local customers 
rather than relying on targeted program regulations on loan size, 
term structure, disbursement schedule, and repayment plan. In so 
doing, they also avoid some political pressures about who should 
be granted a loan. In Bangladesh, for example, where bank-
customer relations are not well developed in the nationalized 
commercial banks, local committees prepared lists of borrowers 
eligible for targeted loans. Once a farmer's name appeared on 
the list, he considered that he had a right to a loan rather than 
merely being eligible. 
view. 
Local politicians often supported this 
Borrower responsibility regarding loan repayment may 
increase when it is known that local deposits are the source of 
funds. It is commonly argued in the Philippines that a "dole-
out" mentality helps explain low recovery in government sponsored 
lending (Sacay, et. al). The source of funds also affects the 
group dynamics of institutions. Poyo observed that Honduran 
credit unions that mobilized a large amount of deposits were 
"saver-dominated"; they developed policies and procedures that 
protected savers by ensuring a high rate of loan recovery. 
Credit unions that relied heavily on borrowing, however, became 
"borrower-dominated" and experienced lower loan recovery. 
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Latin American cooperatives and credit unions represent an 
example of what happens when a financial institution abandons its 
commitment to deposit mobilization. Credit unions thrived in 
many countries in the 1960's. In the 1970's, several began 
retailing large amounts of external funds. Over time, interest 
rates paid on deposits fell in real terms, the real level of 
deposits contracted, and loan recovery declined. This 
combination was almost fatal to many credit unions. Projects 
were designed in the 1980's to resurrect morbid credit unions and 
cooperatives in Peru (Vogel), in Honduras (Poyo), and the 
Dominican Republic (Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo) through deposit 
mobilization. Raising interest rates and savings promotion 
campaigns caused a dramatic increase in deposits. Loan recovery 
also improved. In the Dominican Republic, delinquency declined 
from 71 to 10 percent in one credit union, from 48 to 7 percent 
in a second, and froa 45 to 15 percent in a third. An important 
reason for making loan payments on schedule is the prospect of a 
future larger loan. When credit union liquidity recovered so new 
loans could be made, borrowers were more inclined to repay 
existing loans. 
Regulation and Supervision 
There is great concern today over the proper role and 
function of institutions, especially central banks, that regulate 
and supervise financial institutions. It is clear that the 
supply-leading strategy of rural finance, undertaken in many 
cases through central bank lead~rship, distracted central banks 
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from their traditional role of creating and maintaining a strong 
currency and banking system. Instead they became preoccupied with 
developing policies for and aonitoring the performance of 
agricultural lending. Therefore, vast resources are spent 
compiling data and reporting on scores of different lending 
programs. The lending institutions in turn must devote their 
scarce resources to generate the primary data. The Agricultural 
Development (Krishi) Bank in Bangladesh, for example, developed a 
form with over 150 rows to document lending by crop, loan type 
and donor program. For a time, the Central Bank required all 
3,000 plus rural bank branches to submit complicated reports with 
this information. This flood of data swamped the Bank's ability 
to computer process and analyze it. 
At the same time that central bank resources are spent to 
compile information that makes little contribution to monitoring 
the health of the financial system, resources are unavailable to 
conduct regular comprehensive bank inspections. It is not 
uncommon to find that banks and/or bank branches have not been 
inspected for several years. Furthermore, inspections are often 
limited to a cursory review of whether or not appropriate records 
are being maintained of targeted programs. 
To insure the viability of financial institutions, 
re~ulation and supervision must be refocused on three areas: 
portfolio diversification, insider lending, and liquidity 
management. A financial institution must diversify its asset 
portfolio to survive in the long term. This implies a mix of 
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loans and other assets, and within its loans a mixture of types, 
borrowers and geographic locations. Policies that encourage 
targeted lending increase a lender's risk by encouraging high 
loan/deposit ratios and a concentration of loans on particular 
crops, types of borrowers, or regions. Then any adversity, such 
as production or marketing problems, affecting those crops, 
borrowers, or regions has a disastrous impact on the lender. 
Loans to insiders (management, staff, directors, and their 
relatives) require special monitoring. They contribute to 
portfolio concentration, they frequently increase loan 
delinquency, and they demoralize depositors who have worthy 
projects but are crowded out of getting loans. The problem may 
be exacerbated in credit unions that are largely self-regulated 
and that receive external funds without appropriate controls 
(Marion). 
Financial institutions must be sufficiently liquid to meet 
unexpected demands from depositors and to make emergency loans to 
valued customers. The seasonality of sources and uses of funds, 
especially in regions where agriculture predominates and is 
highly seasonal, increases liquidity management problems for 
rural financial institutions. High reserve requirements are 
sometimes rationalized because of this problem; but, in fact, 
their real purpose is to tax the financial sector. Financial 
regulators must monitor financial institutions to ascertain that 
they have a diversified portfolio of loans and non-loan assets, 
and provide them with a mechanism for loans and discounts to 
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bridge temporary liquidity constraints. Credit union federations 
have created their own central liquidity facilities to act as a 
lender of last resort for credit unions experiencing liquidity 
needs, and to monitor credit union safety and soundness.6 In 
some cases in South America, federations have increased the funds 
available by engaging in direct retail savings mobilization 
(Marion). 
Economic Environment 
The agricultural sector in many developing countries 
frequently suffers from discriminatory policies. Food prices are 
kept low to aid urban consumers. Exchange rates are overvalued 
to protect local industries. Furthermore, frequent policy 
changes have sometimes introduced more variability in domestic 
prices than exist in international markets. Subsidized interest 
rates are sometimes rationalized as means to compensate for some 
of this discrimination. But the obvious point is that if profit· 
margins are low and highly variable, rational farmers should b~ 
wary about their ability to repay loans, and lenders should be 
cautious about lending to them. Crop insurance and guarantee 
funds are poor substitutes for good reliable farm income when 
evaluating debt repayment capacity. 
Rather than concentrate so much attention on inducing 
lenders to make more loans to farmers, policy makers need to be 
more concerned about improving the economic environment so 
far~ers become better credit risks. As Gonzalez-Vega observed 
"credit interventions cannot correct for the negative impact of 
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other policies or compensate for low returns from rural 
investments. Subsidized loans are neither an efficient nor an 
equitable instrument to reduce the urban bias of price policies. 
Subsidized loans do not make unprofitable investments profitable. 
Credit does not make the required inputs available; it does not 
build nonexistent roads, bridge or storage facilities; it does 
not create missing markets.or reduce yield variability" (pg. 9). 
CREATING VIABLE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
A major problem in building rural financial institutions is 
to select the right type of organization (Mittendorf, 1986). 
There may be no single type of institution that is superior to 
another in a particular situation. Rather each type of 
institution may have a comparative advantage in some aspect of 
finance (Rielly). For example, a unit bank has the advantage of 
being flexible in adapting to local market needs, but may have a 
risky portfolio of loans concentrated in a small geographic area. 
Informal sources of funds such as moneylenders' may be able to 
provide loans at low borrower transaction costs, but rarely 
mobilize a large amount of savings from other households or make 
large, long-term investment loans. 
Secondly, bad policies can destroy good institutions. The 
case described above of failing credit unions in Latin America 
when they became retailers of government and donor funds is an 
example. Many unit banks in the Philippines have failed in 
recent years because of low recovery rates on targeted loan 
programs, while several others have prospered because they 
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mobilized deposits and carefully chose their borrowers 
independent of government programs (Sacay, et. al). 
Third, some institutions appear to be successful for a time 
because their weaknesses are hidden. The nationalized commercial 
banks in Bangladesh can be considered successful if one accepts 
the large amount of implicit government subsidy represented by 
their delinquent loan portfolios. However, when two of them were 
denationalized two years ago, they quickly liquidated several 
rural branches and stopped participating in government 
agricultural credit programs. Pilot efforts such as the Comilla 
Cooperatives in Bangladesh were successful but encountered great 
problems when expanded nationwide. One suspects that if the 
subsidies and privileges provided in many programs were made 
transparent, enthusiasm would wane for many so-called success 
stories, or at least there would be a clearer understanding of 
their supposed success. 
Transaction costs are a key variable in determining the type 
of institution that is most appropriate for a given situation. 
Commercial and development banks are large, impersonal, highly 
regulated, bureaucratic institutions. They are most efficient in 
handling large, complex transactions. They can operate across 
broad geographic regions including international transactions. 
They are capable of providing important nonbank services to their 
clientele. They are expensive to operate, however, so are not 
likely to be cost effective in offering simple, low transaction 
cost services to the poorest, geographically isolated households. 
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Therefore there are definite limits to the extent that bank 
branching can resolve the problem of access to financial services 
for many rural households.7 
On the other hand, ROSCAS (rotating credit societies), 
credit unions, and informal self-help groups can inexpensively 
provide simple financial services. Some of their transaction 
costs are transferred to their members who are happy to absorb 
them in order to receive financial services otherwise unavailable 
to them. Additional use needs to be made of informal sources 
(traders, merchants) who operate in interlinked markets.a By 
providing loans with inputs and marketing services, they can 
reduce transaction costs for borrowers and improve loan recovery. 
The key to developing a viable financial system is to 
encourage the most simple organizations to emerge at the lowest 
level, and provide increased linkages between institutions and 
between the formal and informal sector so that the limitations of 
the simple organizations can be overcome. 
PRIORITIES FOR DEVELOPING VIABLE RURAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
The experiences of the past two decades in supply-leading 
rural finance have helped identify several priorities to be 
addressed in the future development of rural financial systems in 
developing countries. 
1 . Economic environment. The economic environment in which 
rural farm and nonfarm businesses operate must be 
substantially improved in many countries before rural 
financial institutions will thrive. The attempts in Sub-
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Saharan Africa in recent years to increase farmer incentives 
by improving product prices and marketing efficiency can be 
expected to also improve prospects for improved rural 
financial intermediation (Mittendorf, 1987). The improved 
supply of farm inputs, exemplified by the privatization of 
fertilizer and tubewell distribution in Bangladesh, -is 
another example of improved economic environment. 
2. Financial policies. Progress is being made in several 
countries to improve financial policies. The deregulation 
or reduced regulation of interest rates is reducing 
disincentives to rural lending in Honduras, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. Countries like Brazil with high 
inflation rates, however, are encountering difficulty in 
establishing a consistent interest rate policy. Bangladesh 
and the Philippines have tightened rediscount policies to· 
stimulate deposit mobilization, but many countries still 
rely on government and donors for a large amount of loanable 
funds to agriculture. 
3. Deposit mobilization. Several countries are improving their 
performance in mobilizing rural deposits and several 
institutions are becoming true financial intermediaries. 
Deposit mobilization in Bangladesh has grown much faster in 
rural than in urban bank branches. The Agricultural 
Development Bank in the Dominican Republic is demonstrating 
the potential that specialized banks have for deposit 
mobilization when encouraged or permitted to do so. The 
4. 
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recent credit union experience in Peru, Honduras and the 
Dominican Republic demonstrates the impact that key policy 
and management changes can have on deposits. Deposit 
mobilization is not easy or cheap, but is an important 
source of funds for institutions that obtain the confidence 
of rural households and provide financial instruments to 
meet their needs. 
Regulation and supervision. The capacity to adequately 
regulate and inspect financial institutions has not ke~t 
pace with their expansion and development (Polizatto). 
Unless this capacity is increased several fold in the next 
few years, corruption and other abuses will continue in 
several countries, depositors and investors will be 
inadequately protected, and accounting practice• will 
continue to overstate the soundness of financial 
institutions. One of the problems of financial innovation 
has been the bureaucratic nature of central banks and other 
regulatory authorities. The Reserve Bank of India has been 
innovative itself but was negative towards the innovative 
practices of the Syndicate Bank (Bhatt). The central bank 
in Bangladesh has often been resistant to innovations 
proposed by the nationalized commercial banks. Far too 
frequently, regulatory authorities have prevented banks from 
operating at more convenient hours, or offering new 
financial products and services, or experimenting with new 
innovations. A good deal of institution building is needed 
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in central banks, and in insurance and guarantee funds so 
that the important functions of regulation and inspection 
are speedily performed. SACRED can provide an important 
role in disseminating information about successful 
innovation and in lobbying for flexibility and change by 
regulatory bodies. 
5. Self-help organizations. The literature on developing 
societies is filled with examples of traditional self-help 
and mutual aid organizations. Frequently, however, they 
have been regarded as interesting artifacts of traditional 
societies that are expected to disappear as countries 
modernize. Many countries, of course, have supported formal 
cooperatives with results that typically range from mediocre 
to disastrous with South Korea and Taiwan being clear 
exceptions. Thanks to the tenacious efforts of a few 
authors (such as Bouman; Holst; Seibel and Damachi), the 
important financial services these organizations provide to 
low-income people are becoming better appreciated. A better 
understanding of how these organizations can be expanded and 
strengthened through linkage with the formal financial 
sector is still needed. The efforts underway by APRACA 
should make important contributions to this knowledge 
(Quinones, 1987). The Asian Development Bank and OECD wjll 
also soon report on their informal financial sector research 
in Asia and Africa. The central question is how government 
6. 
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and donors can relate to these organizations without 
undermining them. 
Credit unions. Credit unions are formal financial 
institutions, although less regulated than banking 
institutions, that embody self-help principles. They are 
also the one form of cooperative that seems to be expanding 
worldwide on a fairly sound financial base. Surprisingly, 
like self-help groups, they are often ignored in discussions 
about the development of rural finance. Clearly they offer 
advantages in reduced transaction costs, intimate knowledge 
of clientele needs, important deposit services, and 
potential for good loan recovery. They have made important 
strides in strengthening themselves through federations that 
provide management and financial services. Increased 
attention is needed to determine under what conditions self-
help groups evolve into more formal credit unions, and 
credit unions evolve into financial institutions providing 
more complex bank and non-bank services. 
7. Cost and risk reducing innovations. Many regulations 
implemented in the supply-leading strategies have been cost 
and risk increasing for financial institutions. Thus banks 
have avoided making targeted loans or have passed the costs 
and risks on to borrowers through non-interest charges that 
raise borrower transaction costs (Bhatt). Experiments are 
underway with innovations to reduce costs and risks, and 
there may be interventions that policymakers can take to 
• 
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induce innovations. The FAO experimentation with 
microcomputers in Asian bank branches wjll help determine 
the conditions under which they are a cost effective way to 
manage small deposit and loan accounts. Many countries are 
using mobile banks and mini-bank outlets to increase access 
and reduce costs. The Philippines has been successful in 
expanding rural loans through the Qued~n Guarantee Fund 
Board program, and the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (Tolentino). Deposit insurance is not yet 
widespread but corild reduce the subjective risk of small 
savers. The Syndicate Bank in India effectively used the 
Pigmy Deposit Scheme to collect at the doorsteps of the 
saver. Several Bangladesh banks are testing whether 
increased mass marketing or direct financial incentives to 
depositors or bank staff are more effective in mobilizing 
deposits. The weekly repayment schedule on Grameen Bank 
loans raises operating costs but helps maintain a high loan 
recovery rate. A frequent repayment schedule seems to have 
also been effective in many lending projects for small 
nonfarm enterprises. 
Conclusions 
Prospects are better today than anytime in the past two 
decades for developing viable rural financial iristitutions. 
Privatization and deregulation are underway around the world. 
Market incentives are increasingly taking the place of plans, 
targets and quotas in directing economic activities. Scholars, 
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policymakers and donors ~re expressing their dissatisfaction with 
large, bureaucratic, public sector operations and have 
rediscovered the forgotten strengths of the informal sector. The 
weaknesses of the supply-leading rural finance model have been 
exposed, and neither governments nor donors have the resources to 
sustain the required subsidies. The trend is clearly towards 
rural financial intermediation rather than simply agricultural 
lending. 
Rural finance is important. A country must develop a 
financial system to accompany and stimulate economic development. 
Self-finance, barter, and informal finance all have a role to 
play at a particular stage in the development of a household or a 
nation. Formal institutions must emerge, however, to supplement 
and strengthen the financial system. 
The development of a viable financial system is difficult, 
costly and time-consuming. No one model is likely to serve the 
needs of all nations at all stages of development. Developing 
the appropriate mix of policies and institutions is a task each 
country must face. The exchange of information and experiences 
that occurs through SACRED represents an important part of the 
search for solutions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For those readers desiring more information, the following 
items will be useful: Adams and Graham; Adams, Graham and 
Von Pischke; Adams and Vogel; Chew; Donald; Howell; Hussi; 
Lieberson; Meyer; Schmidt and Kropp; Von Pischke; Von 
Pischke, Adams and Donald. 
2. For example, Cuevas and Graham found that lender transaction 
costs for lending through a government-owned and a 
privately-owned bank in Honduras far exceeded the 3-4 
percent margin allowed with donor funds. Lending costs for 
the private bank using donor funds were nearly five times 
the cost of lending its own money for farmers. Likewise, 
Ahmed and Adams found that the Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
was limited to charging 7-9 percent per year on loans when 
its administration costs average 10-15 percent of the value 
of loans. 
3. Mittendorf (1986) cites Quinones' (1985) summary of recovery 
rates in several Asian countries. 
4. The variables representing effort to collect were the most 
significant in a Nepal study conducted by Maharjan, et al. 
5. The link between deposit mobilization and viable financial 
institutions is discussed in greater detail in my paper 
included in the Report of the Third SACRED Consultation. 
6. Almeida Pinho and Graham recently completed an analysis of 
ways to strengthen credit unions in Portugal through 
portfolio diversification and improvements in the newly 
created central liquidity facility. 
7. Research by Khalily, et. al showed how bank branching in 
Bangladesh contributed to deposit mobilization but did not 
provide evidence of branch viability. 
8. Esguerra showed how some of the linked programs in the 
Philippines operated better than some direct lending 
programs. 
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